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Balanced harvesting was introduced as an alternative strategy to size-at-entry11
fishing with the aim of maintaining ecosystem structure and functioning. Balanced12
harvesting has been criticised on a number of grounds, including that it would13
require an infeasible level of micromanagement and enforcement. Recent results14
from a size-spectrum model show that the distribution of fishing mortality across15
body sizes that emerges from the behaviour of a large number of fishing agents16
corresponds to balanced harvesting in a single species. Size-spectrum models dif-17
fer from classical size-structured models used in fisheries as they are based on a18
bookkeeping of biomass transfer from prey to predator rather than a von Berta-19
lanffy growth model. Here we investigate a classical Beverton-Holt model coupled20
with the Gordon-Schaefer harvesting model extended to allow for differential fish-21
ing pressure at different body sizes. This models an open-access fishery in which22
individual fishing agents act to maximise their own economic return. We show that23
the equilibrium of the harvesting model produces an aggregate fishing mortality24
that is closely matched to the production at different body sizes, in other words25
balanced harvesting of a single species. These results have significant implications26
because they show that the robustness of balanced harvesting does not depend on27
arguments about the relative production levels of small versus large fish.28




Size-structured models are a standard tool in fisheries science for determining the sizes32
of fish to target and the overall level of fishing mortality, and date back to Beverton and33
Holt (1957). The size-at-entry is typically set at a level which prevents harvesting of34
fish: (i) which have not yet had chance to reproduce (termed recruitment overfishing);35
(ii) which have not yet reached their full growth potential (termed growth overfishing)36
(Sparre and Venema, 1989). The level of fishing mortality is set at or below the level37
that produces the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). This calculation typically relies on38
an assumed stock-recruitment relationship that specifies the number of new recruits for39
a given spawning stock biomass (Beverton and Holt, 1957; Ricker, 1954).40
Drawbacks to selectively targeting large fish include destabilisation of fish stocks due41
to truncation of age structure (Hsieh et al., 2010), impaired recruitment due to the loss of42
large female mega-spawners (Hixon et al., 2014), and fisheries-induced evolution (Laugen43
et al., 2014). Balanced harvesting (BH) has been suggested as an alternative strategy,44
defined as distributing a moderate mortality from fishing across the widest possible range45
of species, stocks, and sizes in an ecosystem, in proportion to their natural productivity46
so that the relative size and species composition is maintained (Garcia et al., 2012, 2015).47
In this definition, productivity was taken to mean “the amount of new organic matter48
produced per biomass unit”, with dimensions per unit time (Garcia et al., 2012). However,49
subsequent modelling studies (Law et al., 2012, 2016) defined productivity as the gross50
amount of biomass produced, which is usually termed production in the fisheries literature51
(e.g. Christensen and Pauly, 1992) and has dimensions mass per unit time. We adopt52
the interpretation of BH by Law et al. (2012) and define BH as a fishing mortality that53
is proportional to production in the rest of this paper.54
There are two main facets to BH: (i) how fishing pressure is distributed over species;55
(ii) how fishing pressure is distributed over body sizes (Garcia et al., 2012). This paper56
is concerned with the second of these. Numerous studies have investigated the effect of57
different distributions of fishing mortality over sizes. The yield per recruit is maximised58
when fishing mortality is concentrated at the size at which the biomass of an unexploited59
cohort peaks, denoted lopt (Beverton and Holt, 1957; Beddington and Kirkwood, 2005).60
However, catching fish of a unique size is clearly impractical in reality. Instead, mass-61
specific fishing mortality is commonly modelled as a size-selectivity function, for example62
a knife-edge or an S-shaped curve representing a trawl fishery (Sparre and Venema, 1989;63
Millar, 1992; Froese et al., 2016) or a dome-shaped curve representing a gillnet or longline64
fishery (Millar and Holst, 1997; Kolding et al., 2015). This allows parameters of the size-65
selectivity curve, such as the size at first capture, to be optimised. For example, Froese66
et al. (2016) suggested that the size at first capture should be set smaller than lopt, such67
that lopt is mean, rather than the minimum, size of fish in the catch.68
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The preceding examples all use a top-down approach, concerned with optimising a69
given pattern of fishing mortality determined by management. An alternative, bottom-up70
approach is to ask what pattern of fishing emerges as a result of decisions by multiple71
fishing agents, in response to economic or other drivers, about where and how to invest72
their fishing resources. Such studies have investigated the distribution of fishing effort73
across space, stocks or fishing technologies (Gillis et al., 1993; Gillis and van der Lee,74
2012; van Putten et al., 2012; Burgess, 2015). This approach has also been applied to75
the distribution of aggregate fishing effort of size or age classes that emerges from the76
size-selectivity of multiple fishing agents (Tahvonen, 2009; Ravn-Jonsen, 2011; Quaas77
et al., 2013). Diekert (2012) showed that, if individual fishers can target fish of any size78
of their choosing, economic returns are equalised across size classes and are much lower79
than in a managed fishery (i.e. a monopoly scenario). Plank et al. (2016) showed that, in80
such circumstances, the emergent fishing mortality is closely matched to the production81
of fish of different sizes – in other words, balanced harvesting – and that fishers avoid82
catching fish smaller than lopt as it is economically unattractive to do so. The result of83
Plank et al. (2016) was demonstrated using a size-spectrum model, which is based on84
a bookkeeping of the biomass flows from prey to predator and from parent to offspring85
(Benôıt and Rochet, 2004; Andersen and Beyer, 2006). The size-spectrum model used86
by (Plank et al., 2016) predicts that the peak in production, and therefore lopt, occurs at87
relatively small body sizes. This prediction is controversial and is rightly being subjected88
to scrutiny (Froese et al., 2015, 2016; Andersen et al., 2016).89
Importantly, however, the prediction that individual fishers will self-organise so that90
their aggregate fishing mortality is proportional to production stems from a model for91
fishers’ choice of target fish size. Equilibrium is reached when no individual can increase92
his/her catch by switching to a different target size. This concept is not limited to size-93
spectrum models, but is applicable to any size-structured population model. Here, we test94
this prediction using a classical Beverton-Holt model for a single species. We show that95
the distribution of fishing mortality over size that emerges as a result of fishers attempting96
to maximise their own net profits is still closely matched to production. This is important97
because it means that the second facet of BH – the distribution of fishing pressure over98
body sizes within a species – is a robust, emergent outcome of fishers choosing what size99
fish to target, regardless of the relationship between production and body size.100
2 Bioeconomic model101
We use a bioeconomic model consisting of three submodels: (i) a model for the ecological102
dynamics of the fish population, structured by body mass; (ii) a harvesting model de-103
scribing how the level of fishing effort and its distribution over body mass changes with104
time; (iii) a stock-recruitment relationship.105
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2.1 Size-structured population model106
We use the McKendrick-von Foerster partial differential equation (McKendrick, 1925;107
von Foerster, 1959) for the density n(w, t) of individuals of body mass w.108
∂
∂t
n(w, t) = −
∂
∂w
(G(w)n(w, t)) − (µ(w) + F (w, t)) n(w, t), (1)
This is a size-structured model for a population with growth rate G(w), natural mortality109
rate µ(w) and harvesting mortality F (w, t) at body mass w and time t. Eq. (1) is110
equivalent to a Beverton-Holt model (Beverton and Holt, 1957; Sparre and Venema,111
1989) (see Supplementary Material, section 1 for details).112
The analysis that follows is applicable with any growth and natural mortality func-113
tions. However, for the purposes of presenting numerical results, we use a von Bertalanffy114












where w∞ is the asymptotic body mass, K is the von Bertalanffy growth parameter and117
b ≈ 3 is the exponent relating length l to mass w via w ∝ lb. The von Bertalanffy118
growth model is commonly used to describe size-at-age in fish populations and estimates119
are available for the growth parameter K and asymptotic mass w∞ for a wide variety of120
species, see for example Fishbase (www.fishbase.org). For the natural mortality rate, we121








The fishing mortality F (w) is described by a harvesting model, which we describe in the123
Sec. 2.2; the boundary condition for Eq. (1) at mass-at-birth w = w0 is given by a124
stock-recruitment relationship, which we describe in Sec. 2.3.125
2.2 Harvesting model126
The classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1954) de-127
scribes the fishing effort on an unstructured population. Here, we extend the Gordon-128
Schaefer model to allow the fishing effort E(w, t) (dimensions per unit time) to depend129
on body mass w:130
∂
∂t
E(w, t) = kE(w, t)
(




where q ≤ 1 is the catchability, p is the market price of fish (dollars per unit mass),131
c is the unit cost of fishing (dollars) and k is a constant describing how rapidly effort132
responds to changes in economic returns. For generality, we allow the market price p(w),133
catchability q(w) and unit cost c(w) to depend on the body mass targeted.134
The key assumption underlying the model is that the rate of change of the harvesting135
pressure at a given body mass is proportional to the difference between the revenue from136
that body mass, p(w)q(w)E(w, t)w2n(w, t), and the cost c(w)E(w, t), both of which have137
dimensions dollars per unit time. This is a model of a situation, such as a gillnet fishery,138
where individual fishers can decide what size of fish to target via their choice of mesh size139
(Kolding et al., 2015). The fishing effort E(w, t) represents the total amount of time spent140
by fishers targeting fish of body mass w. If there is profit to be made from targeting fish141
of mass w, then more fishers will do so, resulting in an increase in E(w, t). If targeting142
fish of mass w results in a loss, then fishers will cease doing so, resulting in a decrease in143
E(w, t). This describes an open-access regime, where more people join the fishery when144
it is more profitable than alternative forms of economic activity, and vice versa.145
The reason for the factor of w2 in the revenue term is an assumption that fishing gear146
typically targets a percentage range of body masses rather than an absolute range. For147
example, suppose a 5 cm gillnet selects fish from 50 to 100 g. The assumption would then148
be that other size gillnets also select for body masses ranging over a factor of 2 (e.g. 500149
to 1000 g) rather than over a 50 g range. This is consistent with log-normal selectivity150
curves fitted to empirical catch data (Millar and Holst, 1997; Kolding et al., 2015). We151
do not explicitly model individual gears, but this example illustrates the assumption that152
translates into the revenue function seen in Eq. (4) (see Supplementary Material, section153
2 for derivation).154
Cost in this model includes both actual costs, such as fuel and equipment, and oppor-155
tunity costs. The so-called bioeconomic equilibrium is reached when net profit is zero,156
i.e. when the return from fishing is the same as could be achieved from switching to some157
other form of economic activity. From Eq. (4) we see that the bioeconomic equilibrium158






where f(w) = p(w)/c(w) is the ratio of unit price to unit cost for fish of body mass w,161
which will be referred to as the profitability. Here, B(w) = n(w)w2 has dimensions of mass162
and represents the amount of biomass in a logarithmic interval at body mass w in a given163
volume (Andersen and Beyer, 2006). Eq. (5) therefore defines a threshold biomass at164
which targeting fish of a given body mass w becomes economic. In the exploited size range165
(i.e. body masses for which E(w) > 0), the biomass B(w) must equal the threshold value166
of 1/(f(w)q(w)). In any size range where the biomass B(w) is less than this threshold,167
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there is no fishing (i.e. E(w) = 0). The bioeconomic equilibrium is equivalent to the Nash168
equilibrium in the model of Plank et al. (2016), where a population of fishers i = 1, . . . ,m,169
each targeting body mass wi with fixed fishing capacity, all obtain the same net profit.170
This is also analogous to the “perfect selectivity” results of Diekert (2012), who referred171
to the quantity p(w)B(w) as the biovalue, and the result that equilibrium net profit is172
zero as dissipation of resource rent.173
If unit cost, unit price and catchability are all independent of target body mass, then174
Eq. (5) means that biomass B(w) is constant in the exploited body mass range. This175
corresponds to “invariance of biomass” (sensu Sheldon et al., 1977; Boudreau and Dickie,176
1992). The mechanism behind is that, if there are body mass ranges with higher biomass,177
fishers can obtain higher profits by targeting them, which reduces the biomass in until it178
is in line with other body masses (Plank et al., 2016). This means that, once the system179
reaches equilibrium, all fishers obtain the same the catch per unit effort, regardless of the180
body mass they choose to target.181
2.3 Stock-recruitment relationship182
We examine three different stock-recruitment relationships: (i) constant recruitment; (ii)183
the Beverton and Holt (1957) model; (iii) the Ricker (1954) model. Typically in fisheries,184
recruitment means survival to a certain age, size or life stage. However, for any given185
recruitment size, a fixed proportion of eggs will be recruited under the natural mortality186
model (Andersen and Beyer, 2015). We therefore specify recruitment by specifying the187
rate of production of newborn fish of body mass w0, and set w0 to represent the mass188
of a typical fish egg. As we are dealing with equilibrium solutions, we will omit the189
t argument in the following. The recruitment rate provides a boundary condition for190
the size-structured population model by specifying n(w0), the density of fish of mass191
w0. Spawning stock biomass S is calculated as the total biomass of fish greater than a192
specified mass-at-maturation wm.193
Under constant recruitment, R = R∗, recruitment is entirely decoupled from the194
spawning stock biomass, and hence from the effects of fishing. This is equivalent to a195
yield-per-recruit framework. It also helps isolate the effects of impaired recruitment that196
can arise in the Beverton-Holt and Ricker models.197
The Beverton-Holt equation for recruitment is an increasing function of S that satu-198





where S50 is the spawning stock biomass at which recruitment is at 50% of its maximum.200
To ensure the different stock-recruitment models are comparable, we require that all three201
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models produce the same level of recruitment R∗ when the spawning stock biomass is at202
its unexploited level, which we denote S = S∗. This condition determines the value of203
S50 to be S50 = S
∗(Rmax/R
∗ − 1).204
Under the Ricker model, recruitment is an increasing function of S when S is low,205
but then peaks and starts to decline at higher levels of S:206
R = αSe−S/β. (7)
Applying the condition that recruitment must equal R∗ when S = S∗ gives α = R∗/S∗eS
∗/β.207
The value of β is then chosen so that the maximum recruitment is Rmax and the unex-208
ploited state is on the declining part of the Ricker curve.209
3 Results210
3.1 Equilibrium solution211
We begin by presenting an analytical equilibrium solution of the coupled McKendrick-von212
Foerster and Gordon-Schaefer model. Details of the derivation and method for finding213
the exploited body mass range are given in Supplementary Materials, section 3; here we214
present the key results. Under the bioeconomic equilibrium given by Eq. (5), the fishing215





















This solution applies for any specified functions for profitability f(w), catchability217
q(w), growth rate G(w) and natural morality rate µ(w). An important special case is218
when the profitability and catchability are independent of body mass and the growth and219
mortality functions are given by Eqs. (2) and (3). In this case, the fishing effort in Eq.220
(8) is221













Ecologically, the value of ρ is expected to be between 0.2 and 0.33, with some evidence222
for ρ = 1/3 (Lorenzen, 1996, 2000).223
Of interest is the relationship between fishing effort and production, defined as the224
total rate of new biomass production by all fish of body mass w, P (w) = wn(w)G(w),225
with dimensions of mass per unit time (note this was termed productivity by Law et al.,226
2016; Plank et al., 2016). In the exploited body mass range, the biomass is constant at227
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Table 1: Model parameter values.
Parameter Symbol Value
von Bertalanffy growth rate K 0.2 yr−1
Length-weight exponent b 3
Egg mass w0 0.001 g
Maturation mass wm 590 g
Asymptotic mass w∞ 2000 g
Adult natural mortality µm 0.3 yr
−1
Natural mortality exponent ρ 0.2





















Since b ≈ 3 and ρ is close to 0.33, the terms (w/w∞)
−1/b and (w/w∞)
−ρ in Eqs. (9)229
and (10) are close to being proportional. For values of w ≪ w∞, the constant term230
−bK is small relative to the terms of w and therefore E(w) and P (w) will both be almost231
proportional to w−1/3. As w gets closer to w∞, the constant term becomes more important232
and so the proportionality between fishing effort and proportionality will become weaker233
close to the asymptotic body mass. This prediction will be tested numerically in the234
following section.235
3.2 Numerical results236
To calculate explicit equilibrium solutions, numerical values for model parameters are237
needed; these are shown in Table 1. Empirical (McGurk, 1986; Lorenzen, 1996, 2000;238
Gislason et al., 2010) and theoretical (Peterson and Wroblewski, 1984; Andersen and239
Beyer, 2006, 2015; Law et al., 2015) evidence points towards an allometric mortality rate240
with an exponent ρ in the range 0.2 to 0.33, and we use a value of ρ = 0.2. We set the241
adult natural mortality rate µm to be 1.5K, which is one of the Beverton-Holt life-history242
invariants (Charnov and Berrigan, 1991; Jensen, 1996), and is consistent with empirical243
data in many species (Prince et al., 2015; Froese et al., 2016). We study a species with an244
asymptotic body mass of w∞ = 2000 g and a body mass at maturation of wm = 0.295w∞,245
which is consistent with the Beverton-Holt life-history invariant (Charnov and Berrigan,246
1991; Andersen and Beyer, 2015).247
We first investigate the special case when neither catchability q = 1 nor profitability248
f = p/c vary systematically with body mass. As with the classical Gordon-Schaefer249
model, the profitability (ratio of unit price to unit cost) effectively determines the overall250
8





















































































































Figure 1: Equilibrium biomass, production and fishing effort against body mass for three
levels of profitability f : (a,b) f = 0.2×10−3 g−1; (c,d) f = 10−3 g−1; (e,f) f = 2×10−3 g−1.
Left column shows exploited biomass (solid), unexploited biomass (dashed) and critical
biomass level for fishing to be economic (1/f , dotted). When the biomass reaches the
critical level, fishing begins and creates a constant biomass solution in the exploited body
mass range. Right column shows fishing effort (grey) and production (black). Results
are for constant recruitment.
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level of fishing pressure, with increasing profitability (either high market prices or low251
fishing costs) leading to increased effort and decreased stock biomass. If f is sufficiently252
high, overfishing can occur, meaning that stock is depleted below a level that can provide253
MSY, or fish are being caught before realising their growth potential. We therefore test254
a range of parameter values for f , ranging from very low, where equilibrium effort is zero255
because fishing is not economic, to very high, where overfishing occurs. We investigate256
the pattern of size-selectivity, i.e. the relationship between fishing mortality and body257
mass, that emerges from the model.258
Figure 1 shows the biomass B(w) of the stock, the fishing effort E(w) and the pro-259
duction P (w) as functions of body mass w. Results are shown for three different levels of260
profitability f . Solutions are calculated in the size range w > 0.001 g, but only plotted261
for w > 1 g as biomass, production and effort are all very small for w < 1 g. Recall from262
Eq. (5) that fishing at body mass w will only take place if the biomass B(w) reaches the263
threshold level 1/f , which is shown as a horizontal dotted lines in Fig. 1(a,c,e). When the264
profitability is only just large enough for fishing to be economically viable (Fig. 1(a,b)),265
all of the fishing effort is concentrated on the body mass where the biomass peaks, which266
for this set of parameters values is a body mass of just over 1000 g. As profitability in-267
creases, overall fishing pressure increases, the biomass becomes depleted to the threshold268
level over a range of body masses and it becomes equally attractive to fish anywhere in269
this range. For example, in Fig. 1(d), fish are being targeted from approximately 100 g270
to 1000 g in body mass; the biomass density is constant at 1/f = 1000 g within this body271
mass range and less than 1/f outside this range (Fig. 1(c)). At these higher levels of272
fishing pressure, the distribution of effort over body mass that emerges in the exploited273
range range is closely matched to the production (Fig. 1(d,f)), in agreement with the274
theoretical predictions.275
Results for the Beverton-Holt and Ricker stock-recruitment relationships are given in276
Supplementary Material, section 4. The only difference relative to the constant recruit-277
ment case is that, for a given level of profitability, the minimum body mass exploited278
is slightly higher than under constant recruitment. This is because when recruitment279
is impaired as a consequence of fishing, biomass does not reach the threshold level for280
fishing to be economic until slightly larger body mass (see Supplementary Figures S1-S3).281
Figure 2(a,b) show how the aggregate yield and aggregate effort (calculated by in-282
tegrating yield and effort respectively over all body masses from w0 to w∞) vary as283
profitability increases. The aggregate effort can be thought of as a measure of the total284
number of boat-hours spent fishing. Under all three stock-recruitment relationships, there285
is a maximum in the yield curve at an intermediate level of profitability; if profitability286
is too high, the yield starts to drop. In the constant recruitment case, this can only be287
a result of growth overfishing, i.e. catching fish before they have reached peak cohort288
biomass. Under the Beverton-Holt and Ricker models, the maximum occurs at a lower289
10













































































Figure 2: Yield, effort and minimum body mass fished as profitability increases: (a)
aggregate yield against profitability f ; (b) aggregate yield against aggregate effort; (c)
minimum body mass fished wF,min against aggregate effort; (d) yield against effort for
a managed fishery, in which fishing is concentrated at the body mass at which cohort
biomass peaks (approx. 420 g). Results are shown for constant (solid), Beverton-Holt
(dashed) and Ricker (dotted) stock-recruitment. In (c) the curves are the same for all
three stock-recruitment relationships; thin vertical dotted lines indicate the level of fishing
effort which maximises yield.
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levels of profitability and effort and produces a lower yield, than under constant recruit-290
ment. This is because recruitment overfishing is possible under the Beverton-Holt and291
Ricker models, as well as growth overfishing. Figure 2(c) shows how the smallest body292
mass fished wF,min changes with increasing effort levels. As effort increases, progressively293
smaller fish are caught. For a given level of effort, wF,min is independent of the choice of294
stock-recruitment relationship.295
The maximum possible yield in a Beverton-Holt model is achieved when fishing effort296
is concentrated on a single size corresponding to the maximum biomass of a cohort297
(Beverton and Holt, 1957; Beddington and Kirkwood, 2005; Froese et al., 2016), which298
for the parameter values used here occurs at a body mass of approximately 420 g. In299
practice, it is impossible to restrict fishing mortality to a single body mass but this300
idealised case, sometimes known to as the potential yield (Froese et al., 2016), gives a301
useful comparison with the open-access model.302
Figure 2(d) shows the yield from fishing only at a body mass for 420 g (termed a303
managed fishery), as a function of the fishing effort (see Supplementary Material, section304
5 for details). For the case of constant recruitment, the yield from the managed fishery305
is an increasing function of effort and tends towards the potential yield as the fishing306
effort tends to infinity (Beverton and Holt, 1957; Beddington and Kirkwood, 2005). The307
potential yield is 38% higher than the maximum yield in the open-access fishery, but308
this is an extreme scenario as it corresponds to completely depleting the spawning stock309
biomass. For the Beverton-Holt and Ricker recruitment models, the maximum sustainable310
yield from the managed fishery is 13% and 3% higher respectively than in the open-access311
fishery. As expected, concentrating the fishing mortality at the theoretical optimum body312
mass increases yield; however, it is notable that the difference between the maximum313
sustainable yields of the managed and open-access fisheries, both of which are idealised314
scenarios, is relatively small.315
We now investigate what happens when there is dependence of profitability (defined as316
the ratio of unit price to unit cost) on body mass targeted. We set the profitability f(w)317
to be an increasing function of body mass w. This could model a higher market price318
for large fish, a lower cost for targeting large fish, or a combination of both effects. We319
choose a function f(w) for which fish of around 270 g are about half as profitable of fish320
of the asymptotic mass of 2000 g (see Supplementary Material, section 5). This makes it321
economic to harvest larger fish down to lower biomass. As a result, the threshold biomass322
above which fishing is economic is no longer constant, but is a decreasing function of body323
mass (Fig. 3(a,c,e)). This shifts the fishing effort towards larger body masses compared324
to the results in Fig. 1. Nevertheless, there is still a close correspondence between the325
production and the emergent distribution of fishing effort over body mass in Fig. 3(d,f).326
We also tested the effect of setting the catchability q(w) to be an increasing function of327
body mass w. This models a situation where large fish are easier to catch than small328
12























































































































Figure 3: Equilibrium biomass, production and fishing effort against body mass where
large fish fetch a higher unit price than small fish, and three levels of maximum profitabil-
ity fmax: (a,b) fmax = 0.2 × 10
−3 g−1; (c,d) fmax = 0.6 × 10
−3 g−1; (e,f) fmax = 2 × 10
−3
g−1. Left column shows exploited biomass (solid), unexploited biomass (dashed) and
critical biomass level for fishing to be economic (1/f(w), dotted). Right column shows
fishing effort (grey) and production (black). Results are for constant recruitment.
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ones for the same amount of time spent fishing. This could be because schools of larger329
fish are easier to locate using sonar equipment, or because the gear used to catch larger330
fish is more efficient. This results in the same fishing mortality as in Fig. 3, but higher331
fishing effort is required at smaller body masses within the targeted range to compensate332
for the reduced catchability (see Supplementary Fig. S5).333
4 Discussion334
We have investigated a size-structured bioeconomic model which allows fishing effort to335
vary as a function of body mass. The effort at a given body mass will increase if fishing336
that body mass returns a positive net profit (i.e. revenue from catch per unit effort337
exceeds cost per unit effort) and will decrease if it returns a net loss. This is an extension338
of the Gordon-Schaefer model (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1954) to allow fishing effort to339
depend on body mass. The model assumes that the market price of fish is independent of340
the size of the catch. In reality, price will depend on supply and this could be modelled341
by an elasticity relationship.342
The result that an open-access fishery, combined with perfect size selectivity, leads to343
net profit from fishing being equalised to zero across body sizes is not new. Diekert (2012)344
demonstrated this using a similar model and referred to it as dissipation of rents along the345
dimension of size. The new result presented here is that, at equilibrium, the aggregate346
fishing mortality is closely matched to production across body sizes. We have tested this347
in a model with constant recruitment (equivalent to a yield-per-recruit calculation) and348
two different stock-recruitment relationships. When market price, cost and catchability349
are independent of body mass, fishing is predicted to lead to a constant distribution of350
biomass in logarithmic body mass intervals. We have also tested scenarios in which either351
the ratio of unit price to unit cost, or the catchability, is an increasing function of body352
mass.353
The close match between fishing mortality and production across body sizes corre-354
sponds to BH within a single species. This is an emergent outcome of the model, rather355
than an externally applied rule, providing a counterpoint to arguments that implementa-356
tion of BH would require impractical levels of monitoring, micromanagement and enforce-357
ment (Burgess et al., 2015; Froese et al., 2015; Reid et al., 2016). It also confirms that358
this outcome is not limited to size-spectrum models (Plank et al., 2016) and is robust to359
model selection. Interestingly, the match between fishing mortality and production only360
applies for body sizes down to a minimum capture size, below which fishing is not eco-361
nomically attractive. This suggests a more nuanced definition of BH across body sizes as:362
“a moderate mortality from fishing applied to sizes above the size at which production is363
maximal, and distributed in proportion to production”. However, the most appropriate364
definition depends on the relative values placed on competing objectives, such as yield,365
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profit and conservation, and the consequences of this alternative definition require further366
research. In addition, it is important to recognise that the size at which production peaks367
(or equivalently cohort biomass peaks Law et al., 2016), although classically treated as a368
fixed externality, in reality will vary as a consequence of fishing changing the growth and369
mortality rates at different sizes (Plank et al., 2016).370
Our argument is not about fishing patterns or management strategies that maximise371
either yield or profit. Instead, they are a prediction about the pattern that would emerge372
as a consequence of size-selectivity decisions made by independent fishing agents. The373
yield obtained under such a pattern is not the global maximum sustainable yield, which for374
the Beverton-Holt model is theoretically obtained by fishing exclusively at lopt – the size375
at which unexploited cohort biomass is maximal (Beverton and Holt, 1957; Beddington376
and Kirkwood, 2005). Nonetheless, the predicted yield from allowing fishing agents to377
choose what size fish to target is only slightly lower than the theoretical maximum. This378
is a counterpoint to the results of Froese et al. (2016), which showed that, if fishing379
mortality is constant above size at first capture, then targeting small fish significantly380
reduces yield (growth overfishing). This does not happen in our bioeconomic model381
because fishing mortality is not constrained to be the same at all body sizes, but is382
allowed to adapt to the net profit obtained by targeting different sizes. Production is a383
decreasing function of body mass for sufficiently large fish and, when size-selectivity is384
the product of the actions of independent fishing agents, the aggregate fishing mortality385
reflects this declining production at large sizes.386
If the objective is to maximise the profit of a fishing monopolist, the theoretical387
solution is to fish exclusively at the size at which biovalue is maximised (which may be388
greater than lopt if larger fish have higher value unit value) at a fishing mortality less389
than FMSY (Diekert, 2012). As with the classical Gordon-Schaefer model, net profit at390
the bioeconomic equilibrium is zero by definition. This means that the economic return391
from fishing, over a range of body sizes, is the same as could be obtained from alternative392
economic activity. This is the predicted outcome of an open-access regime, where agents393
can enter the fishery as long as it is profitable to do so. If the cost of fishing is low (or the394
economic prospects from alternative activities are poor), this leads to depletion of the395
stock below the level that can provide MSY. This is a well-known property of open-access396
models (Schaefer, 1954), rather than of the distribution of fishing effort over body sizes397
per se. We are not advocating open-access fishing: controls on fishing effort are clearly398
needed to prevent overfishing, irrespective of the pattern of size selectivity.399
The predicted match between fishing effort a production has been observed in small-400
scale African freshwater fisheries, for example Lake Kariba between Zambia and Zim-401
babwe (Kolding et al., 2015), the Bangweulu Swamps in Northern Zambia (Kolding et al.,402
2003) and Lake Volta in Ghana (Kolding and van Zwieten, 2014). In these examples, ag-403
gregate fishing mortality is the product of a large number of individual fishers employing404
15
a wide range of gear types and mesh sizes, often without effective size-based regulations405
(Kolding and van Zwieten, 2011; Mills et al., 2011). The pattern of size-selectivity in406
large-scale, commercial fisheries is clearly very different. This is a consequence partly407
of size-based regulations prohibiting the targeting of small fish, and partly of the size-408
selectivity of the fishing gears in use. Trawl fishing typically selects all fish larger than a409
certain size and the current model is not equipped to describe this situation. The model410
could be modified to investigate trawl fisheries, for example by making the aggregate411
fishing mortality the sum of a set of S-shaped or knife-edge selectivity curves. Diekert412
(2012) showed that this resulted in a similar trend towards catching fish smaller than lopt413
and decreasing resource rents, but the relation between the emergent pattern of fishing414
mortality and production deserves further investigation.415
It has been argued that the requirement of BH to fish is proportion to production416
would require infeasible levels of monitoring of production and micromanagement of fish-417
ing effort (Burgess et al., 2015; Froese et al., 2015; Reid et al., 2016). Our results show418
that a balanced distribution of fishing effort across body mass can emerge, at least approx-419
imately, from the behaviour of independent agents trying to maximise their own economic420
returns. In reality, size selectivity is the product of numerous factors, including gear type,421
mesh size, species morphology and behaviour, and spatiotemporal deployment of fishing422
effort. Many of these factors are difficult to control and it is unlikely we will ever be able423
to target fish with perfect selectivity (Breen et al., 2016). Our results should not be seen424
as quantitatively realistic predictions, but they do reveal an underlying, self-organising425
principle by which fishing effort becomes matched with production.426
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